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1. Introduction 
The top management of a firm faces a potential conflict of interest when that firm becomes an 
acquisition target. Top managers can work hard to drive up the premium offered by the acquirer, but as 
they do so, are more likely to have to find new jobs if the acquisition takes place. Alternatively, they can 
bargain less vigorously for a higher premium in the hope of or even in exchange for keeping their jobs 
and receiving other private benefits, such as the acceleration of the vesting of options and retirement 
benefits. Courts and the press have recognized this conflict of interest. For instance, in a recent decision, a 
judge concludes that a CEO “had powerful interests to agree to a price and terms suboptimal for public 
investors so long as the resulting deal” gave him some benefits including “the chance to continue his 
managerial positions for a reasonable time.”
1 This conflict of interest is even more serious when top target 
managers are allied with the acquirer as is common in acquisitions made by private equity firms. 
Incumbent management’s heightened conflict of interest in such acquisitions has been the subject of much 
attention in the press. For instance, an article in the Financial Times notes that “[t]here are always 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers of public companies, but they escalate when 
private equity firms hove into view. Take Justin King, chief executive of Sainsbury’s, the supermarket 
chain. We are told that Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, CVC Capital Partners and Blackstone want him to stay 
if they buy the business and will no doubt give him a stake. Whose side is Mr. King now on?”
2 In this 
paper, we investigate the determinants of target CEO retention by the acquirer and whether the gains 
made by target shareholders from the acquisition depend on whether the CEO is retained by the acquirer. 
Though much attention has been paid to the view that the conflict of interest between target CEOs 
and their shareholders is costly to shareholders (henceforth the “conflict of interest” hypothesis), an 
acquirer might instead find the acquisition to be more valuable precisely because of the anticipated 
retention of the target’s CEO and might therefore pay less for the acquisition if the CEO were to exit at or 
shortly after the completion of the merger. For instance, part of the attraction of acquiring Bank One for 
1 In Re: Lear Corporation Shareholder Litigation, Opinion, Court of Chancery, Delaware, June 15, 2007. 
2 “Sleepwalking into a new insider scandal,” by John Gapper, The Financial Times, February 5, 2007. 
2   
       
           
           
     
     
   
       
       
     
           
       
       
   
         
         
     
           
         
 
             
       
       
     
             
                                                 
     
       
   
JP Morgan Chase was the fact that the CEO of Bank One, Jamie Dimon, was viewed as a likely future 
CEO of the acquirer.
3 We call this hypothesis the “valuable CEO” hypothesis. Another view is that, as a 
result of the conflict of interest, the acquirer has to pay more when the conflict of interest is most intense, 
namely in private equity transactions where the CEO is part of the acquiring team, to avoid subsequent 
litigation. Consequently, the target shareholders receive a larger fraction of the value created through the 
transaction. We call this hypothesis the “shareholder bribe” hypothesis. 
The three hypotheses we investigate have sharply different predictions for CEO retention and for 
target premiums. We would expect the interests of the CEO and target shareholders to be better aligned if 
an acquisition takes place when insiders have a large stake in the target. If the acquirer is bribing the CEO 
to facilitate the acquisition, such an effort can be expected to have less of an impact for the acquirer if the 
target has high insider ownership because the insiders have strong incentives to take actions to maximize 
the value of their stake. Yet, we find that the probability that the incumbent CEO is employed by the 
acquirer increases with insider ownership which appears to be inconsistent with the conflict of interest 
hypothesis. Not surprisingly, CEO retention is more likely for private equity acquisitions, yet is also more 
likely for acquisitions by private operating companies. With the conflict of interest, we would expect the 
CEOs to be most concerned about retention when their firm has performed poorly. If the firm has 
performed well, they would be more attractive in the job market. In contrast, with the valuable CEO 
hypothesis, we would expect the acquirer to be more eager to retain CEOs of firms that perform well. In 
support of the valuable CEO hypothesis, we find that the CEO is more likely to be retained if the target 
has better performance, as measured by operating income, or a higher Tobin’s q. There is, however, 
evidence that the CEO is less likely to be retained when the acquisition appears to involve more of a 
contest. More specifically, the CEO is less likely to be retained if there are competing bidders and if the 
merger is brought about by a tender offer. This evidence suggests that there is a personal cost to the CEO 
from resistance, but it is possible that the financial gain made by the CEO on her shares by obtaining a 
3 The New York Times article “Banking Giant: The Overview; $58 Billion Deal to Unite 2 Giants of U.S. Banking” 
dated January 15, 2004 states, “[Dimon] is to take over as chief executive in two years from J. P. Morgan’s leader, 
William B. Harrison, settling the persistent question of succession.” 
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higher premium offsets that cost. Nevertheless, this result could be supportive of the conflict of interest 
hypothesis as it suggests that CEOs who want to remain employed after an acquisition may be better off 
to avoid pushing up the premium through resistance tactics. Of course, it is also possible that acquisitions 
without managerial synergies are acquisitions with more potential acquirers and hence a greater 
likelihood of competition, in which case competition would not be costly for the incumbent CEO. 
Turning to the analysis of the returns to target shareholders, we find no evidence supportive of the 
conflict of interest hypothesis. More specifically, there is no evidence that shareholders of targets 
acquired by public companies receive a lower premium when the CEO is retained by the acquirer. 
However, when the target is acquired by a private equity firm or a private operating company, there is 
some evidence that the premium is higher if the CEO is retained. For acquisitions by private bidders, the 
premium, measured as the announcement abnormal return, is significantly higher when the CEO is 
retained. However, when the premium is measured over longer periods of time, there is no significant 
difference between the premium when the CEO is retained and when she is not. We also investigate 
whether the premium differs when other top management (including the chairperson of the board) is 
retained, but the CEO is not. We find no evidence of lower premiums when management other than the 
CEO is retained. Surprisingly, for the case of public firm acquisitions, we show that target shareholders 
receive a larger premium when a top executive other than the CEO is retained. We also investigate 
whether, among private equity deals, there is a premium difference between management buyouts and 
other private equity transactions. We find no difference. 
The evidence on the valuable CEO hypothesis and the shareholder bribe hypothesis is mixed. The 
valuable CEO hypothesis suggests that the premium is always higher when the CEO is retained, but we 
only find evidence of a higher premium when the CEO is retained for acquisitions by private firms. 
Further, the shareholder bribe hypothesis predicts that transactions where the CEO is part of the acquiring 
team have a higher premium. In contrast, we find no evidence that management buyouts have higher 
premiums compared to other acquisitions by private equity firms or by private operating firms where the 
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CEO is retained. It appears that CEO retention is valuable when a firm is acquired by a private firm, but 
not when it is acquired by a public firm. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by expanding our understanding of the role of CEO private 
benefits in acquisitions. Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) use a sample of friendly acquisitions from 
1995 to 1997 to show that an acquisition results in the CEO of the acquired firm receiving significant 
payments. It is not surprising that the target CEO would receive a payment if the target is acquired 
because CEOs who lose their job in an acquisition rarely show up again as CEOs of other public 
companies (see, e.g., Agrawal and Walkling, 1994). However, Hartzell et al. show that target shareholders 
receive a smaller premium when the CEO receives unusually high private benefits. Moeller (2005) 
predicts that target shareholders receive more in an acquisition if the target CEO is less powerful because 
a powerful CEO bargains more for private benefits and finds supportive evidence using a sample of 
acquisitions from the 1990s. McConnell and Martin (1991) compare disciplinary takeovers, which they 
define as takeovers where the CEO of the target changes soon after the acquisition, and non-disciplinary 
takeovers using a sample of tender offers from 1958 to 1984. They find that there is no difference in the 
cumulative abnormal return for the 41 days surrounding the announcement between the two types of 
acquisitions. Wulf (2004) shows that shareholders of firms acquired in 53 merger-of-equals deals from 
1991 through 1999, where the incumbent CEO remains with the corporation, receive lower returns 
relative to other deals. Matsusaka (1993) does not examine target returns, but he argues that for some 
acquisitions the target management is the main asset acquired. He calls such acquisitions “managerial­
synergy” acquisitions and shows that for a sample of mergers from the 1960s and early 1970s bidder 
returns are higher when target management is retained. It follows from his analysis that, to the extent 
target shareholders capture some of these synergy gains, target shareholders could gain more from the 
acquisition when target management is retained by the bidder. The existing literature offers mixed results 
on the relation between retention and target shareholder gains using very different samples. None of the 
existing papers investigate directly the determinants of retention. Further, these papers only look at 
acquisitions made by public firms. 
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Recent evidence shows that private acquirers pay less for targets than public acquirers (see, e.g., 
Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter, 2008). However, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984) 
study going private transactions in a different era and find that the average premium in all cash going 
private transactions is not different from all cash tender offers by public firms. If acquisitions by private 
equity firms where the CEO is retained are mostly the equivalent of going private transactions, their 
results would imply that private equity firms would not pay less than public firms in acquisitions where 
the CEO is retained. We find that private equity firms pay lower premiums than public firms whether the 
CEO is retained or not. Consequently, the greater likelihood of CEO retention in acquisitions by private 
equity firms cannot explain why private equity firms offer lower premiums than public firms. In contrast, 
however, targets of private operating companies receive the same premium as targets of public companies 
when the CEO is retained, but they receive a lower premium when the CEO is not retained. It follows 
from this result that operating companies find acquisitions to be worth less when they do not find it 
worthwhile to, or cannot, retain the CEO of the acquired company after the acquisition. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the sample construction. In Section 3, we 
investigate the determinants of CEO retention. In Section 4, we compare premiums across acquisition 
types when the CEO is retained and when the CEO is not retained. In Section 5, we examine whether the 
results differ when a top manager who is not the CEO is retained instead of the CEO. We conclude in 
Section 6. 
2. Sample construction 
Our sample of acquisitions comes from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) U.S. Merger and 
Acquisition Database. We focus on a sample of cash-only offers to have an apples-to-apples comparison 
between deals involving private bidders and those involving public bidders. We collect all completed 
majority acquisitions for the period 1994-2006 between U.S. public targets and U.S. bidders in which the 
acquirer owns 100% of the shares of the target after the deal and the form of payment is cash only. We 
exclude all transactions with non-operating targets, without disclosed deal value, and labeled as spin-offs, 
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recaps, self-tenders, exchange offers, repurchases, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining 
interest, or privatizations. We check the Lexis-Nexis database for announcement press releases in order to 
verify the status of private bidders, and we exclude all cases where the bidder is a group of individual 
investors. We further require each target firm to be in the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
and Compustat databases and to have a share code indicating a public firm (10, 11). We follow Schwert 
(1996) and require that the acquisition from first bid to completion takes place in no more than one year. 
These filters result in a sample with 1,263 deals where 352 deals involve a private bidder. Of the 352 
deals involving a private bidder, a private equity firm is the bidder in 50.85% of acquisitions. 
Using the EDGAR database we find documents for 1,138 of the 1,263 deals announced between 1994 
and 2006. We search these documents to determine whether any member of the target top management 
team, including the Chairman of the Board (COB), is retained by the bidder to be employed by the 
merged firm. The only individuals considered for retention are target officers or the COB listed in 
merger-related documents filed with the SEC.
4 We conclude that there is retention if at least one member 
of the target’s management is retained. 
Retention is generally indicated by one of two types of statements. First, “it is generally expected that 
a number of our executive officers will remain after the Merger is completed.” More specific statements 
clearly identify the managers who will be retained. Second, “the executive officers of Il Fornaio that are 
expected to remain officers of Il Fornaio following completion of the merger are Michael J. Hislop 
(President and Chief Executive Officer), Michael J. Beatrice (Executive Vice President of Operations) 
and Paul J. Kelley (Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer).” A deal is classified as 
involving the retention of the CEO if the merger documents have a statement explicitly indicating that the 
CEO is retained. It could be, therefore, that in some retention cases the CEO is retained even though we 
find no information in the merger documents indicating that this is the case. In our analysis, we focus 
4 We primarily review merger-related proxy statements, tender offers, and tender offer agreements. These include, 
but are not limited to, any iteration of S-4, PREM, DEFM, DEFA, DEFC, etc. for mergers and any iteration of 14-D 
and 14-C for tender offers. We examine all documents around the time of the merger announcement up to and 
including the effective date. 
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mostly on cases where the CEO is explicitly retained, but we also investigate the relation between the 
acquisition premium and retention of a top executive other than the CEO. 
The deal is considered to have no retention if there is no mention of retention in the merger 
documents. In addition, we do not classify deals as retention deals if the target’s managers are offered 
new employment agreements by the target firm before the merger unless there is language indicating the 
bidder’s intention to not only honor the agreement (which could simply mean that the bidder intends to 
pay the severance attached to the new agreement), but also to retain the management after the merger. In 
some cases, certain members of target management are indicated as being retained on a temporary basis 
to assist during the transition period of the merger. Such cases and other temporary employment cases 
(employment that is mentioned as temporary, transitional, or a term lasting one year or less) are not 
included in the retention sample. Managers who are offered consulting agreements are also not considered 
to be retained by the acquirer. 
In 505 of the 1,138 deals we find that at least one individual is retained based on the above criteria. 
For the deals where there is retention, we determine whether the target CEO is retained. In 383 of the 505 
deals with retention, the target CEO is retained. Our base sample consisting of 1,016 acquisitions 
excludes the 122 deals in which an executive is retained but the CEO is not. The target CEO is retained in 
225 public bidder deals and 158 private bidder deals (66.46% of these deals involve a private equity 
firm). For 510 (123) public (private) bidder deals there is no retention. Of the 123 deals with a private 
firm acquirer where there is no retention, 38.21% are acquisitions involving a private equity firm. 
3. Determinants of retention 
The conflict of interest and valuable CEO hypotheses have different implications for the 
characteristics of the target when the CEO is retained. In this section, we investigate how firm 
characteristics differ depending on whether the CEO is retained and whether differences in firm 
characteristics are supportive of the hypotheses we have developed concerning the retention of CEOs. 
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Table 1 provides comparisons of firm characteristics by bidder type and CEO retention. For these 
comparisons, we split the sample into acquisitions by public firms and by private firms. We further 
provide data separately for acquisitions by private equity firms and acquisitions by private operating 
firms. For each bidder type, we provide information separately for the acquisitions where the CEO is 
retained and those where she is not. CEO retention occurs in 56.23% of acquisitions by private firms, but 
only in 30.61% of acquisitions by public firms. Private equity bidders retain the target CEO in 69.08% of 
the acquisitions. The CEO is retained in 41.09% of the acquisitions by private operating companies. 
These differences in the frequency of CEO retention across the various bidder types suggest that it is not 
meaningful to unconditionally compare firm and deal characteristics or target premiums for acquisitions 
where the CEO is retained and those where she is not. Such comparisons would effectively amount to 
comparing public firm acquisitions to private firm acquisitions. Throughout Table 1 we report medians, 
except for binary variables where we report means. It is common in corporate finance to focus on medians 
because they are less sensitive to outliers. For binary variables, the mean is a measure of frequency. 
Our first firm characteristic is the level of target insider ownership (TARGET_INSIDE_OWN) 
obtained from the Compact D Disclosure database. Insider ownership in the case of targets of public firms 
is the same whether the CEO is retained or not. In contrast, however, targets acquired by private firms 
where the CEO is retained have significantly higher insider ownership. This result holds for both types of 
private acquirers as well. Strikingly, targets of private acquirers where the CEO is retained have higher 
insider ownership than targets of public firms when the CEO is retained. The opposite result holds for 
acquisitions by private equity firms when the CEO is not retained. 
We use the log of the market value of equity as our measure of size (ln(MVE)). Private bidder targets 
are smaller than public bidder targets except for targets of private equity firms when the CEO is retained. 
For the sample of private acquirers, the target is significantly larger if the CEO is retained than if she is 
not. In contrast, there is no significant difference in the size of targets of public bidders when the CEO is 
retained and when she is not. 
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We consider next four measures of performance: Tobin’s q (Q), industry-adjusted Tobin’s q (IAQ), 
operating cash flow (OCF), and the past twelve month stock return (ARET_12). Tobin’s q is defined as 
the ratio of the firm’s market value of assets (defined as the book value of assets minus the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity) to the book value of assets. Tobin’s q is highest for public firm 
acquisitions. To the extent that Tobin’s q, or industry adjusted Tobin’s q, captures managerial talent or 
managerial synergies, our valuable CEO hypothesis predicts a positive association between Tobin’s q and 
CEO retention. Though Tobin’s q does not differ between the CEO retention sample and the no retention 
sample for acquisitions by public companies or by private operating companies, it is significantly higher 
for private equity acquisitions when the CEO is retained than otherwise. Similar results hold for industry-
adjusted q. 
Operating cash flow, defined as sales minus cost of goods sold, sales and general administrative 
expenses, and change in net working capital, divided by book value of assets, is a measure of 
performance. For public firm acquisitions, there is no difference in operating cash flow between the CEO 
retention sample and the no retention sample. For private firm acquisitions, operating cash flow of firms 
where the CEO is retained is higher than for public firm acquisitions and than for private firm acquisitions 
where the CEO is not retained. The latter result is driven by the acquisitions by private operating firms. 
ARET_12 is measured as the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return for the 12 months prior to the 
runup period or from day -316 to day -63 relative to the announcement date. There is generally no 
difference in ARET_12 when comparing acquisitions by public and private firms. Further, none of the 
median differences between the CEO retention sample and the no retention sample across different bidder 
types are significant. 
Leverage could be considered as a measure of performance as well. However, leverage also affects 
the ability of a firm to make payouts to equity to fend off an acquisition attempt and the ability of a bidder 
to borrow against the assets of the target. Leverage (DEBT), defined as the debt-to-assets ratio, is 
calculated as the book value of debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of 
equity. We find that leverage is higher for public firms when the CEO is not retained than otherwise. 
10   
       
   
 
       
         
           
             
     
       
         
     
           
         
         
         
         
   
         
     
               
 
             
     
           
 
However, for other acquisitions, leverage is the same whether the CEO is retained or not. Interestingly, 
we find that leverage levels are significantly higher for acquisitions by private firms relative to 
acquisitions by public firms for the sample of deals where the CEO retained. 
We consider two stock volatility measures. Firms with greater volatility are likely to be firms with 
greater information asymmetries. CEO retention might be more valuable for such firms. The first measure 
is the stock’s total volatility (STDEV) for days -379 to -127. The second measure is the volatility of the 
stock’s market model residual (STDEVAR) over the period. There is no difference in these measures 
across firms acquired by different bidder types and between retention and no retention samples for a given 
bidder type. 
Our next two measures are liquidity measures. The first measure is a measure of the liquidity of the 
assets of the target (TARLIQ) developed by Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002). This measure is 
the ratio at the four-digit SIC code level of corporate control transactions to the assets of the firms in 
Compustat. A higher value of this measure means that the market for corporate control is more active. We 
would expect more potential competition if the market for the corporate assets is more liquid. With a 
more liquid market, we would expect conflicts of interest to be less important because there would be 
more potential entrants in the bidding for the firm, so that a bidder that agrees to retain the CEO might 
still see the premium driven to where it would have been without retention through competition. There is 
no difference in TARLIQ across bidder types or within bidder types across the retention and no retention 
samples. We also use the Amihud (2002) measure of common stock illiquidity (STOCKLIQ). Greater 
stock liquidity would make it easier for arbitrageurs to take positions and for investors to take block 
positions to influence a deal. We find no evidence of a difference in stock liquidity across types of 
acquisitions. 
Finally, we consider deal characteristics. All variables are binary variables and we report their means. 
We use the following characteristics: whether another offer is made (COMPETE) for the target prior to 
the winning bid, whether the announcement of the offer of the winning bidder is followed by a bid by 
another firm (INITBID), whether the offer is a tender offer (TENDER), whether the bidder has a toehold 




           
           
     
   
             
 
     
             
             
               
       
         
     
               
 
     
     
           
   
     
       
           
         
(TOEHOLD), whether the deal has a target termination fee (TARTERM), and finally whether the deal 
has bidder lockup provisions (BIDLOCK). COMPETE is significantly lower for acquisitions by operating 
companies when the CEO is retained, but not for acquisitions by private equity firms. Private operating 
firm acquisitions are less likely to have target termination fees when the CEO is retained. There is no 
difference for any acquirer type in the frequency of toeholds whether the CEO is retained or not. For 
public firm acquisitions and private equity firm acquisitions, tender offers are less frequent when the CEO 
is retained. Surprisingly, CEO retention is not related to the probability of a subsequent bid. Finally, 
bidder lockups are more likely if the CEO is retained for acquisitions by private operating companies but 
not for acquisitions by other firms. 
The differences across acquirer types in the frequency of CEO retention could be explained by 
differences in target characteristics or deal types rather than by differences in the organizational form of 
the acquirer. In Table 2, we use logistic regressions to investigate whether CEO retention is explained by 
the type of acquirer in addition to firm and deal characteristics. We find that CEO retention is more likely 
if the acquirer is a private firm even when controlling for firm and deal characteristics. The target CEO is 
more likely to be retained when insider ownership of the target is higher. CEO retention is positively 
related to target performance as measured by Tobin’s q and operating income. CEO retention is less likely 
if the market for corporate control for firms in the target’s industry is more active and if there is 
competition for the target. Importantly, CEO retention seems accompanied by agreements that impose 
penalties on the target for walking away from the merger. For a subset of firms, we have the age of the 
CEO. We therefore re-estimate our logistic regressions from Table 2 for that subset of firms. We find that 
the likelihood of CEO retention decreases with the age of the CEO. Adding the age of the CEO to the 
regression does not affect our other conclusions. 
The results in Tables 1 and 2 reveal important differences between targets where the CEO is retained 
by the acquirer and other targets. The CEO is more likely to be retained when the target has performed 
well using operating income and Tobin’s q as measures of performance. Such a result is supportive of the 
valuable CEO hypothesis. We also find that the CEO is more likely to be retained when insiders at the 
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target firm own a greater fraction of the firm’s shares. Such a result does not seem to support the conflict 
of interest hypothesis. At the same time, we find that the CEO is less likely to be retained in acquisitions 
that involve competition and where the bidder makes a tender offer. The CEO can affect the extent of 
competition. The fact that the CEO is less likely to be retained when there is competition suggests that 
there may be a personal cost to the target CEO from resisting aggressively and losing. The existence of 
such a cost would make it more likely that the CEO would bargain for private benefits at the expense of a 
higher premium. Consequently, our study of the determinants of retention, while supportive of the 
valuable CEO hypothesis, does not make it possible to reject the conflict of interest hypothesis. However, 
it could also be that competition is more likely when managerial synergies are low, so that the association 
between CEO retention and lack of competition might simply reveal that the merger is more valuable for 
a specific bidder because of managerial synergies and therefore would not indicate a cost of generating 
competition for the target CEO. To assess the relevance of the various hypotheses, it is therefore 
necessary to consider the relation between CEO retention and the premium paid. 
4. Acquisition premiums and CEO retention 
This section examines the return to the target shareholders from the acquisition. We use the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database to collect daily return data for our sample of targets. We 
estimate target shareholder gains over short event windows using standard event study methods (see, e.g., 
Brown and Warner, 1985). We compute cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) using market model 
abnormal returns based on the CRSP value-weighted index. Market model parameters are estimated from 
day -379 to day -127 relative to the first acquisition announcement day as in Schwert (1996). Such a 
measure is commonly used. It is much less sensitive to benchmark specification (see, e.g., Brown and 
Warner, 1985) than measures that cumulate returns over a long period of time, but it would be biased and 
incomplete if there are systematic differences in how information about acquisition likelihood and terms 
is revealed to the market before and after the bid announcement between different types of acquisitions. 
To account for bid revisions, we calculate abnormal returns from the day before the announcement to the 
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close of the acquisition. We use size and book-to-market adjusted buy-and-hold returns (FFRET).
5 To 
further account for events that precede the announcement, we estimate size and book-to-market portfolio 
adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns from 42 days before the winning bid to completion (WBC). As 
Schwert (1996) notes, this approach to estimating the premium has the advantage of including all of the 
days when the offer to the target shareholders might have changed as well as any pre-bid runup. When 
using this measure of the premium, it cannot be argued that somehow we find differences in premiums 
because takeover contests proceed differently for private bidders than they do for public bidders or for 
cases where the CEO is retained than when she is not. However, this measure has two potentially serious 
problems. First, the return can be affected by news not related to the acquisition since the returns before 
the acquisition announcement can reflect news about the target’s business as a stand-alone firm. As a 
result, the returns estimated over a long period are noisier estimates of the gain from the acquisition. 
Second, the return measure is sensitive to misspecification of the benchmark return.
6 This second problem 
applies to the FFRET measure as well. 
We show first in Table 3 the mean and median CAR estimates. In both Panel A and Panel B, the CAR 
estimates are generally lower for acquisitions by private firms than they are for acquisitions by public 
firms. However, when there is no retention, both the mean and median CARs for acquisitions by private 
equity firms and by private operating firms are lower than for acquisitions by public firms. In contrast, 
where there is CEO retention, only CARs of acquisitions by private equity firms are lower than the CARs 
of acquisitions by public firms. These results indicate therefore that the premium paid by private 
operating companies is lower than the premium paid by public firms only when the acquisition does not 
involve the retention of the CEO. For public firm acquisitions, there is no difference between the CEO 
retention and the no retention samples. In contrast, the CARs are significantly lower for acquisitions by 
private firms when the CEO is not retained. First, using the means, the CAR estimate when the CEO is 
retained is higher by 6.32 percentage points than when the CEO is not retained. This difference is 
5 Size and book-to-market adjusted returns are calculated using the returns on the 25 Fama-French size and book-to­
market portfolios. Our results are similar if we use market-model cumulative abnormal return measures. 
6 See Kothari and Warner (2007). 
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significant at the 10% level. For medians, the difference is 3.68% and it is also significant at the 10% 
level. When we consider separately private equity firm and private operating firm acquisitions, the 
difference in CARs between acquisitions with CEO retention and those without are not statistically 
significant. This seems to be due to the lower power of the tests on the subsamples because the estimates 
of the mean differences in premiums are quite large, ranging from 5.42% for acquisitions by private 
equity firms to 10.36% for acquisitions by private operating firms. In summary, we see no evidence that 
shareholders receive less when the CEO is retained and some evidence that they receive more for private 
firm acquisitions. Table 3 also shows buy-and-hold abnormal returns from the day before the 
announcement to completion of the offer using the FFRET measure. The FFRET returns are significantly 
lower for acquisitions by private firms than for acquisitions by public firms whether the CEO is retained 
or not. However, there is no significant difference between the premium paid when the CEO is retained 
and when she is not for any type of bidder. The results are similar for the WBC estimate of the premium. 
It is interesting to note that for private firm acquisitions the mean difference between the CEO retention 
and no retention samples is slightly negative while the median difference is larger than for the CAR 
results but insignificant. Such differences suggest that the estimates of the WBC premium are much 
noisier. Finally, we also provide data on the runup (RUNUP) in Table 3 which is the market-adjusted 
buy-and-hold return from 63 days prior to the announcement to 6 days prior to the announcement. We 
find that the RUNUP is smaller for acquisitions by public firms where the CEO is retained. There is no 
difference in the RUNUP between the CEO retention and the no retention samples for the other types of 
acquisitions. 
Table 3 does not offer evidence that shareholders are hurt by CEO retention, but instead offers some 
evidence that they benefit. However, we saw in Section 3 that there are many target and deal 
characteristic differences between the CEO retention and no retention samples. It could be, therefore, that 
our evidence on abnormal returns masks differences in premiums once we take into account firm and deal 
characteristics. To conduct this investigation, we estimate regressions where the dependent variable is a 
measure of the premium. Our regressions control for variables that have been used in previous studies to 
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explain abnormal returns associated with acquisition announcements and premiums. These variables are 
the target and deal characteristics we described in Section 3. In addition, we include an indicator variable 
for acquisitions by private firms and an indicator variable for cases where the CEO is retained. These 
regressions are models (1) to (3) of Table 4. Each regression uses a different measure of the premium. 
The coefficient on the CEO retention indicator variable is insignificant for all three regressions. In all 
cases, the coefficient represents a difference of less than one percentage point in the premium in absolute 
value. The indicator variable for private firm acquisitions has a negative significant coefficient in all 
regressions. Consequently, we find no evidence that CEO retention is associated with a lower premium. 
Further, controlling for CEO retention does not affect the known result that acquisitions by private firms 
have a lower premium. 
We next consider the possibility that the relation between the premium and CEO retention depends on 
the type of acquirer. Private equity acquisitions often involve participation of the management of the 
target. In contrast, acquisitions by public firms where the CEO of the target ends up being retained are 
typically not acquisitions where the target CEO is part of the acquisition team. As pointed out in the 
introduction, concerns about the conflict of interest hypothesis have been especially acute for acquisitions 
by private equity firms where the CEO is part of the acquisition team. 
We re-estimate regressions (1) through (3) allowing the coefficient on the CEO retention indicator 
variable to differ if the acquisition is by a private equity firm or by a private operating firm. We also 
allow for the premium to vary depending on the type of acquirer. The coefficient on the CEO retention 
indicator variable captures the difference in premium when the target CEO in an acquisition by a public 
firm is retained. These regressions are models (4) to (6) of Table 4. The coefficient on the CEO retention 
indicator variable is insignificant in each specification. The coefficient on the private equity acquirer 
indicator variable is significantly negative in each specification. In model (4), the interaction between the 
private equity bidder indicator variable and the CEO retention indicator variable is significantly positive. 
It follows that the CAR premium is significantly higher for private equity acquisitions when the CEO is 
retained. Unreported F-tests reveal that, for the CAR measure of the premium, the premium received by 
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shareholders in private equity transactions is higher when the CEO is retained, but remains significantly 
lower than if the acquisition were made by a public firm. The conclusion regarding the difference 
between private equity and public transactions holds irrespective of the premium measure employed. The 
premium on acquisitions by private operating companies is significantly lower in models (4) and (5) but 
not when we use the WBC premium in model (6). As for acquisitions by private operating firms, the 
interaction with CEO retention is positive and significant in regression (4). It is interesting to note that the 
estimate of the interaction is 12.01% whereas the estimate of the private operating firm indicator variable 
is -10.21%. Consequently, the interaction more than offsets the acquirer type indicator variable. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, additional unreported F-tests show that the premium for acquisitions by private 
operating companies is statistically indistinguishable from the premium for acquisitions by public 
companies when the CEO is retained. The premium paid by private operating companies is significantly 
lower than in acquisitions by public firms when the CEO is not retained. In model (5), the interaction 
between the private operating firm indicator variable and the CEO retention indicator variable is positive 
as well. 
It follows from regressions (4) to (6) that CEO retention plays an important role in explaining the 
premium difference between acquisitions by public firms and acquisitions by private firms. Acquisitions 
by private equity firms always have a lower premium, but acquisitions by operating companies have a 
lower premium only when the CEO is not retained. The evidence that CEO retention is valuable for 
acquisitions by private firms but not by public firms is not supportive of the conflict of interest 
hypothesis. The evidence is supportive of the valuable CEO hypothesis, but it raises a puzzle: Why is the 
CEO more valuable for private firm acquisitions than for public firm acquisitions? 
In the introduction, we offered a third hypothesis, labeled the shareholder bribe hypothesis. With this 
hypothesis, when concerns about the conflict of interest are high acquirers would pay more to reduce 
litigation risks. Therefore, we would expect that the difference in premium between CEO retention and no 
retention would be greatest for management buyouts (MBOs) where the executives of the acquired firm 
are involved in the acquisition team. In our sample of acquisitions by private equity firms, we find 54 
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MBOs. The CAR measure for the private equity MBO acquisitions is 23.29% and it is 21.31% for the 
non-MBO private equity acquisitions. The difference between these two estimates is not significant. 
Though we do not report the results in a table, we estimate regressions of the premium on the same 
variables as in Table 4 except that we now have an MBO indicator variable and a CEO retention indicator 
variable. With this classification of acquisitions, we find that neither the MBO indicator variable nor the 
CEO retention indicator variables are individually significant in any of the regressions. Further, the MBO 
indicator variable and the CEO retention indicator variable are not jointly significant. It follows from 
these results that there is no evidence that premiums are different for MBOs. 
A possible concern with the regressions we estimate is that we know that the CEO is more likely to be 
retained when insider ownership is high. High insider ownership makes it less likely that the premium 
will be low because the CEO is pursuing private benefits at the expense of the shareholders. Higher 
insider ownership could also drive up the premium if the supply curve of shares to the bidder is upward 
sloping (Stulz, 1988). Hence, it could well be that the premium is in some cases higher when the CEO is 
retained simply because insider ownership is high, so that retention acts as a proxy for high insider 
ownership. To investigate this possibility, we collect insider ownership for the firms in our sample. For 
the subset of firms for which insider ownership is available, we re-estimate the regressions of Table 4 but, 
following McConnell and Servaes (1990), we add the level and the square of insider ownership to allow 
insider ownership to have a non-linear impact on the premium. Though we do not report these 
regressions, we estimate regressions for the whole sample. In these regressions, the CEO retention 
indicator variable, the insider ownership variable, and the square of the insider ownership variable are not 
significant. However, the private firm acquisition indicator variable has a significant negative coefficient 
in each regression. 
We next consider separate regressions for private and public acquirers. Regressions (1) through (3) of 
Table 5 have the estimates for public firm acquisitions. Neither the CEO retention indicator variable nor 
the insider ownership variables are significant. In regressions (4) through (6), we use the sample of 
acquisitions by private firms. We find that the indicator variable for CEO retention is positive and 
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significant in equation (4). Neither the level nor the square of insider ownership is significant. It follows 
from these regressions that adding insider ownership variables does not affect our conclusions concerning 
CEO retention. 
5. Non-CEO retention 
So far, the analysis has focused on cases where the CEO is retained by the acquirer. When building 
the sample we identified 122 cases where a top-level executive other than the CEO is retained. We 
examine these cases in this section. It is possible that these cases involve CEO retention as well, but the 
documents do not explicitly mention the CEO. If we were to classify these 122 cases as CEO retention 
cases, our earlier conclusions would not change. In this section, however, we assume that the non-CEO 
retention cases are cases where the CEO is not retained. The fraction of cases where non-CEO executives 
are retained but the CEO is not is highest for private operating companies (14.57% of all acquisitions) and 
lowest for private equity acquisitions (8.98%). There are 85 acquisitions by public firms where non-CEO 
executives are retained (10.37%). For these 85 cases, there is some evidence that the premium is higher 
for acquisitions where a non-CEO executive is retained than for acquisitions where a CEO is retained 
(though not for the FFRET measure). The mean CAR is 37.82% when a non-CEO executive is retained 
compared to 30.27% when the CEO is retained, a differences that is significant at the 10% level, but the 
difference of the medians is small and insignificant. The difference in premiums is larger when we look at 
the long-term estimate of the premium, which is 56.13% for the mean when a non-CEO executive is 
retained versus 41.10% when the CEO is retained; again, the difference of the medians is not significant, 
but its magnitude is almost as large as the difference of the means. To conserve space these results are not 
tabulated. In contrast to the results for acquisitions by public firms, there is no evidence that there is a 
difference in premium when we compare acquisitions by private firms where the CEO is retained to those 
where a non-CEO executive is retained. 
We next estimate regressions to assess more precisely whether the premium paid by the bidder differs 
when a non-CEO executive is retained instead of the CEO. We estimate in Table 6 regressions for public 
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firm acquisitions and for private firm acquisitions. Regressions (1) through (3) show the results for the 
public firm acquisitions. We use an indicator variable called RETENTION that equals one if any 
executive is retained. We then have a second indicator variable called NON_CEO_RETENTION. This 
indicator variable equals one if the CEO is not retained but some other executive is retained. We see that 
the estimates of the coefficient on the RETENTION indicator variable are insignificant for all three 
regressions. However, the indicator variable for the NON_CEO_RETENTION indicator variable is 
significantly positive in models (1) and (3) and in model (2) the p-value is 0.11. Consequently, retention 
of a non-CEO executive instead of a CEO leads to a higher premium for target shareholders. In 
regressions not reproduced in a table, we use the sample of acquisitions without CEO retention but 
include an indicator variable for non-CEO retention. In that regression, all coefficients on that indicator 
variable have a positive coefficient. The coefficient is 0.1443 for the WBC measure and is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
Regressions (4) through (6) show estimates of identical regressions but using the sample of private 
firm acquisitions. We see that the coefficient on RETENTION is positive and marginally significant only 
for the CAR measure of the premium, but not the others. The coefficient on NON_CEO_RETENTION is 
insignificant irrespective of the premium measure, so that it does not make a difference for the return to 
target shareholders whether the CEO is retained or the CEO is not retained but some other executive is 
retained. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have investigated the determinants of target CEO retention in an acquisition and the 
implications of target CEO retention for the premium paid by the acquirer. There is much concern that in 
an acquisition the CEO’s interests may not be well-aligned with those of shareholders and that the CEO 
may choose to negotiate for private benefits, including possibly retention, at the expense of a higher 
premium for the shareholders. Our evidence is not supportive of this conflict of interest hypothesis. 
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We consider first the determinants of CEO retention. We find that CEOs of better performing firms 
and of firms with greater insider ownership are more likely to be retained. However, CEOs of better 
performing firms are precisely managers who would have better opportunities in the managerial labor 
market, so that retention would be less valuable for them, and CEOs that the acquirer would be more 
likely to want to retain because their performance is good, so that retention would be less likely to be at 
the expense of target shareholders. Further, when insiders have high holdings of shares, their incentives 
are better aligned with those of other shareholders, so that they will push hard for a higher premium. We 
find that CEOs in tender offers and in competitive situations are less likely to be retained. These results 
are consistent with the view that management that resists more, either directly or by generating 
competitive offers, is less likely to be retained. One could therefore argue that this evidence provides 
indirect support for the existence of a conflict of interest. However, it is also possible that there is more 
competition when managerial synergies are lower, so that CEO retention would be less likely when there 
is more competition for reasons that have nothing to do with the actions of the incumbent CEO. 
When we examine the premium paid by the acquirer, we find that there is no evidence that retention 
is associated with a lower premium. In fact, the evidence we do find on a relation between the premium 
and retention is the opposite. We find that the stock-price reaction to the acquisition announcement is 
higher for private firm acquisitions when the CEO is staying. This result holds for management buyouts 
as well as for acquisitions by private equity firms where the CEO is retained but where the CEO is not 
directly part of the acquisition team. The same result does not hold for acquisitions by public companies. 
In the introduction, we presented two hypotheses that imply a greater premium when the CEO is 
retained. The first hypothesis is that the premium is greater when management is part of the acquisition 
team to decrease the risk of litigation. We find, however, that the premium is greater for acquisitions by 
private operating companies, a result that cannot be explained by this shareholder bribe hypothesis. The 
second hypothesis we called the valuable CEO hypothesis. With this hypothesis, the retention of the CEO 
creates value for the acquisition and the price paid for the acquisition reflects this value. Another, perhaps 
more precise way to describe this hypothesis is that there are managerial synergies as suggested by 
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Matsusaka (1993). However, we find no evidence that the CEO retention is valuable for acquisitions by 
public firms. These results create a puzzle, which is why CEO retention would be more valuable when the 
acquirer is a private firm than when the acquirer is a public firm. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics on target and deal characteristics 
The sample includes all SDC completed cash-only merger and acquisition deals between a U.S. bidder and a U.S. public target announced between 1994 and 
2006 that result in 100% ownership by the bidder. Mean or median target and deal characteristics are reported for public bidder deals, private bidder deals, 
private equity bidder deals, and private operating bidder deals by CEO retention and no retention. The target insider ownership (TARGET_INSIDE_OWN) is the 
aggregate insider ownership listed in the Compact D Disclosure database. The market value of equity (MVE) is from CRSP calculated as the CPI-adjusted (2005 
dollars) price of the stock times the number of shares outstanding 63 days prior to the announcement date. Tobin’s q (Q) is defined as the firm market value 
assets divided by the book value of assets. Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q (IAQ) is defined as Tobin’s q minus the median two-digit SIC code industry value of this 
variable. Operating cash flow (OCF) is defined as sales minus costs of goods sold, sales and general administrative expenses, and change in net working capital, 
divided by book value of assets. ARET_12 is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from day -316 to day -63 relative to the announcement date. Debt-to-assets 
(DEBT) is calculated as the book value of debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. STDEV and STDEVAR are defined, 
respectively, as the raw returns from day -379 to day -127 relative to the announcement date and standard deviation of the market model residuals. TARLIQ is 
the liquidity of the market for corporate control for the target firm’s industry and is defined as the value of all corporate control transactions for $1 million or 
more reported by SDC for each year and two-digit SIC code divided by the total book value of assets of all Compustat firms in the same two-digit SIC code and 
year. STOCKLIQ is the measure of stock illiquidity of Amihud (2002). COMPETE is an indicator variable equal to one if another deal for the same target is 
announced in SDC during the 12 months prior to the announcement date. INITBID is an indicator variable equal to one if the announcement of the offer is 
followed by an offer by another firm, while no bids took place during the 12 months before the announcement. TENDER, TOEHOLD, TARTERM, and 
BIDLOCK are indicator variables from SDC equal to one if the deal respectively is a tender offer, involves a bidder that holds 0.5% or more of the target stock 
prior to the announcement, includes target termination fees, and includes bidder lockup provisions. Mean [median] values for the non-public bidder deals that are 
significantly different from the corresponding mean [median] value for the public bidder deals denoted with a, b, or c, are significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% 
level, respectively. Within the bidder groupings, differences in means [medians] between CEO retention and no retention denoted with α, β, or γ, are significant 
at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
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    Public bidder deals  Private bidder deals  Private equity bidder deals  Private operating bidder deals 
CEO  No  CEO  No  CEO  No  CEO  No 
retention  retention  Difference  retention  retention  Difference  retention  retention  Difference  retention  retention  Difference 
n  225  510  158  123  105  47  53  76 
Mean values 
TARGET_INSIDE_OWN  0.1083  0.1024  0.0059  0.1654




α 0.1702  0.0830  0.0872
γ
ln(MVE)  4.8536  4.8677  -0.0141  4.3585
c  4.2853
a  0.0732  4.6770  4.4107
b  0.2663  3.9952
a  4.1187
a  0.8765 
Q  1.2724  1.2989  -0.0265  1.2004
b  1.0361
a  0.1643




a  0.0489 
IAQ  -0.0483  -0.1111  -0.0628  -0.1939
b  -0.2731
a  -0.0792  -0.1935
b  -0.3101
b  -0.1166  -0.1944
b  -0.2569
b  -0.0625 
OCF  0.0896  0.0850  0.0046  0.12
a  0.0803  0.0397
α 0.1307
a  0.0925  0.0382  0.1041  0.0684  0.0357 
ARET_12  -0.1523  -0.1643  -0.0120  -0.1941  -0.0985  0.0956  -0.1754  -0.0772  0.0982  -0.2123  -0.0991  0.1132 
DEBT  0.0806  0.1114  -0.0308
γ 0.1821
a  0.1451  0.0370  0.1888
a  0.1590  0.0298  0.16
c  0.1425  0.0175 
STDEV  0.0358  0.0336  0.0022  0.0335  0.0352  -0.0017  0.0325  0.0401  -0.0076  0.0351  0.0314  0.0037 
STDEVAR  0.0355  0.0328  0.0027  0.0325  0.0348  -0.0023  0.0318  0.0364  -0.0046  0.0350  0.0314  0.0036 
TARLIQ  0.0454  0.0491  -0.0037  0.0454  0.0470  -0.0016  0.0470  0.0470  0.0000  0.0267  0.0454  -0.0187 
STOCKLIQ 
Median values 
0.0266  0.0177  0.0089  0.0434  0.0848
a  -0.0414  0.0320  0.0661
b  -0.0341  0.0822
a  0.0865
a  -0.0043 
COMPETE  0.0267  0.0725  -0.0459
α 0.0316  0.1138  -0.0822
β 0.0476  0.0638  -0.0162  0.0000  0.1447
c  -0.1447
α
INITBID  0.0267  0.0137  0.0129  0.0190  0.0244  -0.0054  0.0286  0.0213  0.0073  0.0000  0.0263  -0.0263 





a  0.4468  -0.2373
α 0.3208  0.3158
a  0.0050 
TOEHOLD  0.0622  0.0392  0.0230  0.0823  0.0325  0.0498
γ 0.1143  0.0638  0.0505  0.0189
c  0.0132
c  0.0057 
TARTERM  0.7156  0.7255  -0.0099  0.5886
a  0.7073  -0.1187
β 0.6000
b  0.6596  -0.0596  0.5660
b  0.7368  -0.1708
β
BIDLOCK  0.0667  0.0588  0.0078  0.0506  0.0163
a  0.0344  0.0190
b  0.0213  -0.0022  0.1132  0.0132
a  0.1000
β
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CEO retention logistic regression analysis 
The sample includes all SDC completed cash-only merger and acquisition deals between a U.S. bidder and a U.S. 
public target announced between 1994 and 2006 that result in 100% ownership by the bidder. The dependent 
variable (CEO_RETENTION) is equal to one for deals where the target CEO is retained by the bidder and zero 
otherwise. PEBIDDER (POBIDDER) is an indicator variable equal to one if the bidder is a private equity 
(operating) firm. All remaining variables are defined in the header of Table 1. Regressions include year and industry 
(two-digit SIC code main classifications) dummy variables. p-values are in brackets and are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Coefficients denoted with 
a, 
b, or 
c, are significant at the 1%, 5%, or 
10% level, respectively. 
( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 ) 


















[0.009]  [0.008]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
ln(MVE)  0.0052  0.0104  0.0359  0.0205 
[0.930]  [0.877]  [0.598]  [0.760] 
Q  0.1657
b  0.1445  0.1703
b 









[0.077]  [0.061]  [0.082]  [0.048] 
ARET_12  -0.0349  -0.0299  -0.0252  -0.0475 






[0.068]  [0.079]  [0.060]  [0.079] 
DEBT  -0.1872  -0.2683  -0.2304  -0.2538 
[0.651]  [0.514]  [0.582]  [0.536] 
STDEV  2.0311 
[0.645] 
STDEVAR  -1.5754  2.1157 














[0.003]  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.002] 
INITBID  0.2415  0.3828  0.3088  0.2786 






[0.056]  [0.046]  [0.065]  [0.051] 
TOEHOLD  0.4406  0.4627  0.4685  0.4546 
[0.196]  [0.170]  [0.174]  [0.182] 
TARTERM  -0.1567  -0.1853  -0.1494  -0.1646 





[0.053]  [0.040]  [0.056] 
Constant  -1.1024  -1.7999
c  -1.3218  -1.0481 
[0.237]  [0.056]  [0.169]  [0.284] 
Observations  925  928  925  925 
Pseudo R-squared  0.119  0.106  0.125  0.123 
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Table 3 
Target return measures for different bidder types 
The sample includes all SDC completed cash-only merger and acquisition deals between a U.S. bidder and a U.S. 
public target announced between 1994 and 2006 that result in 100% ownership by the bidder. Panel A reports mean 
and median [in brackets] target returns for deals with CEO retention. Panel B reports mean and median [in brackets] 
target returns for deals with no CEO retention. Panel C reports differences in target returns for deals with CEO 
retention and no retention. The variables CAR is the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement 
day, based on market model parameters. The variable FFRET is the Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolio-
adjusted buy-and-hold return from one day before the announcement date to the completion date of the transaction. 
The variable WBC is the Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolio-adjusted buy-and-hold return from 42 
trading days prior to the announcement of the winning bid to the completion date. RUNUP is the market-adjusted 
buy-and-hold return from 63 days prior to the announcement to 6 days prior to the announcement. All reported p-
values are based on t-tests for differences in the mean and on Wilcoxon tests for differences in the median. 
Difference  Private  Difference  Private  Difference 
Public  Private  from public  equity  from public  operating  from public 
bidders  bidders  p -value  bidders  p -value  bidders  p -value 
Panel A: Return measures for deals with CEO retention 
n  225  158  105  53 
CAR  0.3027  0.2624  0.198  0.2369  0.025  0.3130  0.867 
[0.2483]  [0.1994]  0.021  [0.1958]  0.019  [0.2090]  0.271 
FFRET  0.3082  0.2595  0.201  0.2161  0.011  0.3456  0.598 
[0.2497]  [0.1832]  0.021  [0.1686]  0.005  [0.2321]  0.716 
WBC  0.4110  0.3040  0.015  0.2299  0.000  0.4509  0.569 
[0.3330]  [0.2607]  0.004  [0.2146]  0.000  [0.3923]  0.570 
RUNUP  0.0447  0.0593  0.559  0.0311  0.636  0.1152  0.053 
[0.0188]  [0.0341]  0.683  [-0.0041]  0.394  [0.0815]  0.033 
Panel B: Return measures for deals with no retention 
n  510  123  47  76 
CAR  0.3118  0.1992  0.000  0.1827  0.000  0.2094  0.004 
[0.2525]  [0.1626]  0.000  [0.1847]  0.002  [0.1608]  0.001 
FFRET  0.3244  0.2173  0.000  0.1953  0.001  0.2309  0.023 
[0.2742]  [0.1874]  0.002  [0.1868]  0.012  [0.1905]  0.025 
WBC  0.4486  0.3148  0.006  0.2211  0.002  0.3727  0.201 
[0.3801]  [0.1936]  0.000  [0.1625]  0.000  [0.2955]  0.102 
RUNUP  0.0950  0.0754  0.547  0.0393  0.122  0.0977  0.949 
[0.0528]  [0.0111]  0.432  [-0.0077]  0.166  [0.0488]  0.983 
Panel C: Differences in return measures for deals with CEO retention and no retention 
Difference  p -value  Difference  p -value  Difference  p -value  Difference  p -value 
CAR  -0.0091  0.700  0.0632  0.047  0.0542  0.141  0.1036  0.112 
[-0.0042]  0.752  [0.0368]  0.093  [0.0111]  0.274  [0.0482]  0.123 
FFRET  -0.0161  0.579  0.0422  0.262  0.0207  0.645  0.1146  0.127 
[-0.0245]  0.405  [-0.0042]  0.804  [-0.0182]  0.951  [0.0416]  0.331 
WBC  -0.0377  0.324  -0.0107  0.830  0.0088  0.900  0.0782  0.350 
[-0.0471]  0.311  [0.0671]  0.807  [0.0521]  0.482  [0.0968]  0.255 
RUNUP  -0.0503  0.021  -0.0160  0.635  -0.0082  0.845  0.0175  0.729 
[-0.0340]  0.104  [0.0230]  0.866  [0.0030]  0.715  [0.0327]  0.358 
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Target premium multiple regression analysis 
The sample includes all SDC completed cash-only merger and acquisition deals between a U.S. bidder and a U.S. 
public target announced between 1994 and 2006 that result in 100% ownership by the bidder. The dependent 
variable in models (1) and (4) is CAR, in models (2) and (5) is FFRET, and in models (3) and (6) is WBC. The 
dependent variables are defined in the header of Table 3. CEO_RETENTION is an indicator variable equal to one 
for deals where the target CEO is retained by the bidder and zero otherwise. PEBIDDER (POBIDDER) is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the bidder is a private equity (operating) firm. CEO_RETENTION_PEBIDDER 
(CEO_RETENTION_POBIDDER) is an interaction term between CEO_RETENTION and PEBIDDER 
(POBIDDER). All remaining variables are defined in the header of Table 1. Regressions include year and industry 
(two-digit SIC code main classifications) dummy variables. p-values are in brackets and are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Coefficients denoted with 
a, 
b, or 
c, are significant at the 1%, 5%, or 
10% level, respectively. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
CAR3  FFRET  WBC  CAR3  FFRET  WBC 
CEO_RETENTION  0.008  -0.0025  -0.01  -0.0177  -0.0234  -0.015 










[0.000]  [0.005]  [0.002] 
POBIDDER  -0.1021
a  -0.0960
b  -0.0773 
[0.002]  [0.013]  [0.166] 
CEO_RETENTION_PEBIDDER  0.0843
c  0.0368  0.0354 
[0.053]  [0.476]  [0.639] 
CEO_RETENTION_POBIDDER  0.1201
c  0.1466
b  0.0946 
[0.055]  [0.043]  [0.270] 
ln(MVE)  -0.0166
c  -0.014  -0.0363
b  -0.0165
c  -0.0132  -0.0336
b 
[0.078]  [0.175]  [0.011]  [0.076]  [0.194]  [0.018] 
IAQ  -0.0261
a  -0.0243
a  -0.0162  -0.0265
a  -0.0245
a  -0.0161 
[0.002]  [0.008]  [0.205]  [0.002]  [0.008]  [0.199] 
OCF  -0.0111  -0.0207  -0.1293  -0.0121  -0.0222  -0.1258 














[0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
DEBT  0.0047  0.0153  0.0944  0.0022  0.0153  0.1052 
[0.929]  [0.802]  [0.255]  [0.967]  [0.802]  [0.209] 
STDEVAR  0.574  1.2246  0.345  0.595  1.2316  0.3432 
[0.508]  [0.180]  [0.755]  [0.489]  [0.174]  [0.755] 
TARLIQ  -0.1672
b  -0.2449
b  -0.2001  -0.1516
c  -0.2374
b  -0.1704 
[0.031]  [0.018]  [0.135]  [0.057]  [0.025]  [0.213] 
COMPETE  -0.0672
a  -0.0576
b  0.0008  -0.0645
a  -0.0529
c  -0.0006 
[0.002]  [0.035]  [0.987]  [0.003]  [0.053]  [0.990] 
INITBID  -0.0512  0.0772  0.0079  -0.0441  0.0855  0.0155 








[0.000]  [0.000]  [0.026]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.032] 
TOEHOLD  -0.0182  -0.028  -0.1401
b  -0.013  -0.02  -0.1247
c 
[0.609]  [0.589]  [0.033]  [0.708]  [0.699]  [0.058] 
TARTERM  0.011  0.0166  0.0186  0.0122  0.0174  0.0157 
[0.606]  [0.531]  [0.603]  [0.573]  [0.516]  [0.662] 
BIDLOCK  0.0432  0.0476  -0.0221  0.0373  0.0398  -0.0288 








[0.000]  [0.006]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.006]  [0.000] 
Observations  1,011  1,011  1,011  1,011  1,011  1,011 
Adjusted R-squared  0.154  0.169  0.128  0.158  0.173  0.134 
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Target premium multiple regression analysis controlling for target insider ownership 
The sample includes all SDC completed cash-only merger and acquisition deals between a U.S. bidder and a U.S. 
public target announced between 1994 and 2006 that result in 100% ownership by the bidder. Models (1) – (3) are 
for public bidder deals only and Models (4) – (6) are for private deals only. The dependent variable in models (1) 
and (4) is CAR, in models (2) and (5) is FFRET, and in models (3) and (6) is WBC. The dependent variables are 
defined in the header of Table 3. CEO_RETENTION is an indicator variable equal to one for deals where the target 
CEO is retained by the bidder and zero otherwise. TARGET_INSIDE_OWN_SQU is the aggregate insider 
ownership squared. All remaining variables are defined in the header of Table 1. Regressions include year and 
industry (two-digit SIC code main classifications) dummy variables. p-values are in brackets and are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Coefficients denoted with 
a, 
b, or 
c, are significant at the 1%, 5%, or 
10% level, respectively. 
Public bidder deals  Private bidder deals 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
CAR3  FFRET  WBC  CAR3  FFRET  WBC 
CEO_RETENTION  -0.0135  -0.02  -0.0179  0.0640
c  0.0536  0.0074 
[0.594]  [0.514]  [0.656]  [0.062]  [0.182]  [0.899] 
TARGET_INSIDE_OWN  -0.1526  -0.0146  0.1954  0.404  0.2489  0.4497 
[0.294]  [0.931]  [0.412]  [0.119]  [0.419]  [0.249] 
TARGET_INSIDE_OWN_SQU  0.2641  0.1627  -0.0906  -0.4308  -0.2795  -0.7468 
[0.163]  [0.491]  [0.752]  [0.182]  [0.460]  [0.133] 





[0.111]  [0.329]  [0.037]  [0.040]  [0.023]  [0.079] 
IAQ  -0.0255
b  -0.0245
b  -0.0157  -0.0434  -0.0393  -0.0387 
[0.011]  [0.020]  [0.279]  [0.116]  [0.231]  [0.232] 
OCF  -0.055  -0.0703  -0.2095
c  0.3269
c  0.3354
c  0.3275 














[0.000]  [0.000]  [0.008]  [0.041] 
DEBT  -0.0415  -0.0534  0.0312  0.101  0.1416  0.2325
c 
[0.573]  [0.519]  [0.782]  [0.250]  [0.160]  [0.097] 
STDEVAR  0.2012  0.676  -0.78  0.1313  0.8  0.88 
[0.872]  [0.603]  [0.617]  [0.907]  [0.557]  [0.665] 
TARLIQ  -0.3334
b  -0.4692
a  -0.303  0.0942  0.0816  0.0582 
[0.011]  [0.006]  [0.202]  [0.518]  [0.565]  [0.748] 
COMPETE  -0.0533
c  -0.0328  -0.0062  -0.0242  -0.0335  0.1134 
[0.053]  [0.343]  [0.918]  [0.643]  [0.588]  [0.325] 
INITBID  -0.0397  0.0788  -0.0284  -0.0205  0.1027  0.0875 
[0.592]  [0.469]  [0.717]  [0.796]  [0.473]  [0.634] 
TENDER  0.0802
a  0.0867




[0.002]  [0.005]  [0.155]  [0.010]  [0.039]  [0.087] 
TOEHOLD  -0.0252  -0.0547  -0.2140
b  0.0134  0.024  -0.0236 
[0.490]  [0.366]  [0.012]  [0.871]  [0.803]  [0.844] 
TARTERM  0.03  0.0346  0.0405  -0.046  -0.0501  -0.0871 
[0.290]  [0.315]  [0.428]  [0.235]  [0.288]  [0.162] 
BIDLOCK  0.0119  0.0133  -0.0738  0.0468  0.0444  0.164 




a  0.2536  0.7593
a  1.0718
a 
[0.001]  [0.007]  [0.000]  [0.216]  [0.002]  [0.001] 
Observations  664  664  664  261  261  261 
Adjusted R-squared  0.133  0.157  0.103  0.195  0.206  0.121 
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Table 6 
Target premium multiple regression analysis controlling for non-CEO retention 
The sample includes all SDC completed cash-only merger and acquisition deals between a U.S. bidder and a U.S. 
public target announced between 1994 and 2006 that result in 100% ownership by the bidder. Models (1) – (3) are 
for public bidder deals only and Models (4) – (6) are for private deals only. The dependent variable in models (1) 
and (4) is CAR, in models (2) and (5) is FFRET, and in models (3) and (6) is WBC. The dependent variables are 
defined in the header of Table 3. RETENTION is an indicator variable equal to one for deals where any member of 
the target management, including the COB, is retained by the bidder and zero otherwise. NON_CEO_RETENTION 
is an indicator variable equal to one for deals where a member of the target management other than the CEO is 
retained by the bidder and zero otherwise. All remaining variables are defined in the header of Table 1. Regressions 
include year and industry (two-digit SIC code main classifications) dummy variables. p-values are in brackets and 
are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Coefficients denoted with 
a, 
b, or 
c, are significant at the 
1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
Public bidder deals  Private bidder deals 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
CAR3  FFRET  WBC  CAR3  FFRET  WBC 
RETENTION  -0.0193  -0.0249  -0.0124  0.0564  0.0317  -0.0214 
[0.422]  [0.394]  [0.739]  [0.104]  [0.426]  [0.698] 
NON_CEO_RETENTION  0.1001
c  0.1149  0.1505
b  0.0349  0.0421  0.0243 
[0.078]  [0.118]  [0.037]  [0.609]  [0.600]  [0.765] 





[0.242]  [0.587]  [0.017]  [0.013]  [0.019]  [0.072] 
IAQ  -0.0218
b  -0.0233
b  -0.0152  -0.0523  -0.0552  -0.0494 
[0.011]  [0.017]  [0.265]  [0.113]  [0.151]  [0.121] 



















[0.000]  [0.000]  [0.016]  [0.086] 
DEBT  0.0183  0.0229  0.0683  0.0582  0.0951  0.2231
c 
[0.817]  [0.813]  [0.506]  [0.488]  [0.329]  [0.085] 
STDEVAR  0.9883  1.8707  -0.0757  -0.497  0.0458  0.3878 
[0.419]  [0.167]  [0.957]  [0.670]  [0.974]  [0.841] 
TARLIQ  -0.2933
b  -0.3482
b  -0.2859  0.0392  -0.0525  -0.1346 
[0.011]  [0.024]  [0.138]  [0.788]  [0.733]  [0.453] 
COMPETE  -0.0628
b  -0.0599
c  -0.0246  -0.0563  -0.0875  0.0578 
[0.023]  [0.087]  [0.662]  [0.263]  [0.141]  [0.555] 
INITBID  -0.0443  0.087  0.0162  -0.0263  0.1159  0.1294 








[0.000]  [0.001]  [0.048]  [0.013]  [0.038]  [0.063] 
TOEHOLD  -0.0341  -0.0677  -0.1884
a  0.0058  0.0319  -0.0309 
[0.307]  [0.218]  [0.006]  [0.940]  [0.723]  [0.777] 
TARTERM  0.0193  0.0197  0.0459  -0.015  -0.0003  -0.0178 
[0.470]  [0.553]  [0.299]  [0.706]  [0.996]  [0.752] 
BIDLOCK  0.0335  0.036  -0.0423  0.0548  0.0598  0.1721 
[0.474]  [0.555]  [0.575]  [0.391]  [0.520]  [0.256] 
Constant  0.3387





[0.005]  [0.105]  [0.000]  [0.071]  [0.007]  [0.022] 
Observations  817  817  817  316  316  316 
Adjusted R-squared  0.150  0.158  0.128  0.162  0.163  0.128 
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